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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARKANSAS OIL AND GAS LAW, 2015 EDITION 
By Thomas A. Daily1 
IF IT AIN’T BROKE, ARKANSAS’ NEW MAJORITY WILL FIX IT ANYWAY 
Administrative regulation of some industries is a necessary element of 
government.  We live in a complex world.  One industry which absolutely must be 
regulated is the oil and gas business, which has proven that it has the ability to 
absolutely implode2  if left unregulated.  For that reason, oil and gas producing states 
regulate oil and gas production to prevent waste of hydrocarbon molecules and  money 
spent producing those molecules, as well as protecting the correlative rights of the 
owners of those molecules.  Over the last three-quarter century,  producing states have 
accomplished that regulation through administrative agencies.3    That administrative 
regulation has proven advantages: 
1.  Complexity of the Regulatory Problem.  Oil and gas exploration, production and 
associated processes are complicated, involving scientific concepts well beyond the 
understanding of most individuals.  It only makes sense that any regulator of such a 
business should come staffed with the same variety of well-trained brains.  If that kind 
of expertise exists elsewhere in government, it is by accident. 
2.  Speed.  Unlike most of government, administrative agencies can be capable of 
acting and reacting to developments within their regulatory purview in real time, while it 
1Member Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, AR 
2Via the common law Rule of Capture. 
 
3.e. Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, Texas Railroad Commission, Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission, etc. 
 
 
still matters. 
3.  Specialization.  Our economy contains a pretty diverse array of businesses needing 
at least some regulation.  Effective, efficient regulation of each of these requires some 
specialization.  In other words, a good regulator of plumbers may not be so great at 
regulating obstetricians. 
Despite the many good reasons why we have them, administrative agencies are 
not particularly popular, politically.  After all, who wants his or her freedom restricted by 
a bunch of nameless, faceless, unelected bureaucrats?  Well, I do, that is who. I do, 
because I have considered the alternatives.  I do, because I know that the Arkansas Oil 
and Gas Commission, while not perfect, does a pretty darn good job.  Regulation is a 
necessary evil.  Such a specialized, technically competent administrative agency will do 
that job a whole lot better than that bunch we call the General Assembly.  But not 
everyone agrees with me.4    They argue that rules, if we must have rules at all, should 
only come from people directly answerable to the electorate. 
Administrative agencies are not listed as one of our three original branches of 
government, the executive, legislative and judicial.  Rather, they are creatures of the 
legislature, somewhat loosely connected to the executive.  The Oil and Gas 
Commission came about through as a result of Act No. 105 of 1939.5   That statute, as it 
has been amended, empowered the commission to enact reasonable rules, regulations 
4Which I have never understood. 
 
5Codified as Ark. Code Ann. § 15-71-101, et seq. 
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and orders, so as to accomplish is many statutory purposes.6    The Commission is also 
subject to the Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act.7   That act requires all 
administrative agencies to: 
(a)(1) Adopt as a rule a description of its organization, stating the general 
course and method of its operations, including the methods whereby the 
public may obtain information or make submissions or requests; 
(2) Adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all 
formal and informal procedures available, including a description of all 
forms and instructions used by the agency; 
(3) Make available for public inspection all rules and all other written 
statements of policy or interpretations formulated, adopted, or used by the 
agency in the discharge of its functions; 
(4) Make available for public inspection all orders, decisions, and 
opinions. 
(b)No agency rule, order, or decision shall be valid or effective against any 
person or party, nor may it be invoked by the agency for any purpose, until 
it has been filed and made available for public inspection as required in 
this subchapter. This provision shall not apply in favor of any person or 
party with actual knowledge of an agency rule, order, or decision.8 
So, administrative rules are not just permitted, they are required.  It is easy to 
understand why agency rule-books are mandated.  Some of us remember the 1970's, 
‘80's and ‘90's, when practice before the Oil and Gas Commission required knowledge 
of its “unwritten rules,” which, because they were unwritten, were sometime changed, 
ad hoc. 
Whenever I think of those times, I see a vision of my old friend, dearly departed 
6Ark. Code Ann § 15-71-110. 
 
7Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-201, et seq. 
 
8Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-203. 
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Dorsey Ryan, standing before this institute in 1986.  Dorsey’s topic that day was 
“Practice and Procedure before the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission,” about which 
he said: 
For those of you who are not on the Commission’s mailing list, I have 
brought a small supply of the Commission’s written rules of procedure.  If 
there aren’t enough to go around, it shouldn’t take long for those who get 
one to read it and give it to someone who didn’t.  The written rules consist 
of a schedule of hearing dates (almost always the fourth Tuesday of each 
month), inform you that 10 copies of each application must be filed not 
later than 20 days in advance of the hearing, and that the applicant must 
furnish the Commission the names and addresses of interested parties, 
preferably in the form of mailing stickers.  That more or less covers the 
subject of procedures of the Commission, at least insofar as they have 
been reduced to writing.  I will now turn to the far more interesting 
unwritten rules of the Commission; some procedural, some substantive, 
and some that defy description9 
Mr. Ryan’s humorous and accurate description of the Commission’s rules and 
regulations of that time is no longer valid. Our current Commission staff has changed 
that.  A major priority has been to complete and modernize the commission’s book of 
rules.  Today’s Oil and Gas Commission’s rule book is a shining example of competent, 
comprehensive regulation of this complex industry.10    Still, that work will never 
completely finished, because the subject matter of the rules does not stand still.  The 
rules must remain fluid to accommodate changes in the industry, as well as improved 
understanding of the world underground. 
The rulemaking process is set out in the Arkansas Administrative Procedures 
9Dorsey M. Ryan, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE ARKANSAS 
OIL AND GAS COMMISSION, 25th  Annual Natural Resources Law Institute (1986). 
 
10See Thomas A. Daily, RULES DONE RIGHT–HOW ARKANSAS BROUGHT 
ITS OIL AND GAS LAW INTO A HORIZONTAL WORLD, Scheduled for publication in 
Ark. Law Rev. (Oil and Gas Law Symposium Issue (2012)). 
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Act: 
Rules--Procedure for adoption 
(a) Prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule, the agency shall: 
(1)(A)(i) Give at least thirty (30) days' notice of its intended action. 
(ii) The thirty-day period shall begin on the first day of the publication of 
notice. 
(B) The notice shall include: 
(i) A statement of the terms or substance of the intended action or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved; and 
(ii) The time, location, and manner in which an interested person may 
present his or her position on the intended action of the agency or on the 
issues related to the intended action of the agency. 
(C) The notice shall be mailed to: 
(i) A person specified by law; and 
(ii) A person who has requested advance notice of rule-making 
proceedings. 
(D) Unless otherwise provided by law, the notice shall be published: 
(i) In a newspaper of general daily circulation for three (3) consecutive 
days and, when appropriate, in those trade, industry, or professional 
publications that the agency may select; and 
(ii) By the Secretary of State on the Internet for thirty (30) days under § 
25-15-218; 
(2)(A) Afford all interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit 
written data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing. 
(B) The agency shall grant an opportunity for an oral hearing if requested 
by twenty-five (25) persons, by a governmental subdivision or agency, or 
by an association having at least twenty-five (25) members. 
(C) The agency shall fully consider all written and oral submissions 
respecting the proposed rule before finalizing the language of the 
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proposed rule and filing the proposed rule as required by subsection (e) of 
this section. 
(D) If an interested person requests a statement of the reasons for and 
against the adoption of a rule before adoption or within thirty (30) days 
after adoption, the agency shall issue a concise statement of the principal 
reasons for and against its adoption, incorporating its reasons for 
overruling the considerations urged against its adoption. 
(E) When rules are required by law to be made on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing, the provisions of that law shall apply in place of this subdivision (a)(2); 
and 
(3) Consider the following factors: 
(A) Whether the agency is required by statute to adopt the proposed rule, 
whether by a specific date, and whether the agency has discretion to 
promulgate rules; 
(B) Other statutes relevant to the proposed rule and its alternatives; 
(C) The specific nature and significance of the problem the agency 
addresses with the proposed rule including without limitation: 
(i) The nature and degree of the risks the problem poses; 
(ii) The priority of addressing those risks as opposed to other matters or 
activities within the agency's jurisdiction; 
(iii) Whether the problem warrants new agency action; and 
(iv) The countervailing risks that may be posed by alternative rules for the 
agency; 
(D) Whether existing rules have created or contributed to the problem the 
agency is addressing with the proposed rule, and whether those rules 
could be amended or repealed to address the problem in whole or in part; 
(E) Reasonable alternatives to the proposed rule including without 
limitation: 
(i) Adopting no rule; 
(ii) Amending or repealing existing rules; and 
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(iii) Other potential responses that could be taken instead of agency 
action; 
(F) The financial impact of the proposed rule; and 
(G) Any other factor relevant to the need for and alternatives to the 
proposed rule. 
(b)(1) An agency shall not adopt, amend, or repeal a rule unless the rule 
is based on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic, 
or other evidence and information available concerning the need for, 
consequences of, and alternatives to the rule. 
(2) An agency shall adopt the least costly rule considered under this 
section, unless: 
(A) The additional benefits of the more costly rule justify its additional cost; 
(B) The agency explains its reason for adoption of the more costly rule in 
writing; 
(C) The reason is based on the interests of public health, safety, or 
welfare; and 
(D) The reason is within the scope of the agency's statutory authority.11 
The Administrative Procedures Act does permit an agency to somewhat speed 
the above process by adopting an “emergency rule,” after finding that ‘imminent peril to 
the public health, safety, or welfare or compliance with federal law requires adoption of 
a rule upon less than thirty (30) days’ notice and states in reasons for that finding.” 
However, an emergency rule may be effective for no longer than 120 days and may 
only be extended or renewed by a rule adopted under the more formal process.12 
Starting in 2007, legislation imposed another requirement upon administrative 
11Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-204 (a) and (b). 
 
12Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-204 (c). 
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regulators, the statement of economic impact.  That requirement now resides in § 25- 
15-204 (e) and (f): 
(e)(1)(A) An agency shall file with the Secretary of State, the Arkansas 
State Library, and the Bureau of Legislative Research a copy of each rule 
proposed by it and a financial impact statement for the proposed rule. 
(B) A rule shall be filed in compliance with this section and with §§ 
25-15-218 and 10-3-309. 
(2) The Secretary of State shall keep a register of the rules open to public 
inspection, and it shall be a permanent register. 
(3) If the purpose of a state agency rule is to implement a federal rule or 
regulation, the financial impact statement shall include: 
(A) The cost to implement the federal rule or regulation; and 
(B) The additional cost of the state rule. 
(4)(A) If a financial impact statement reveals a new or increased cost or 
obligation of at least one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) per year to 
a private individual, private entity, private business, state government, 
county government, municipal government, or to two (2) or more of those 
entities combined, the agency shall file written findings at the time of filing 
the financial impact statement. 
(B) The written findings shall be filed simultaneously with the financial 
impact statement and shall include without limitation: 
(i) A statement of the rule's basis and purpose; 
(ii) The problem the agency seeks to address with the proposed rule, 
including a statement of whether a rule is required by statute; 
(iii) A description of the factual evidence that: 
(a) Justifies the agency's need for the proposed rule; and 
(b) Describes how the benefits of the rule meet the relevant statutory 
objectives and justify the rule's costs; 
(iv) A list of less costly alternatives to the proposed rule and the reasons 
why the alternatives do not adequately address the problem to be solved 
8 
 
by the proposed rule; 
(v) A list of alternatives to the proposed rule that were suggested as a 
result of public comment and the reasons why the alternatives do not 
adequately address the problem to be solved by the proposed rule; 
(vi)(a) A statement of whether existing rules have created or contributed to 
the problem the agency seeks to address with the proposed rule. 
(b) If existing rules have created or contributed to the problem, an 
explanation of why amendment or repeal of the rule creating or 
contributing to the problem is not a sufficient response; and 
(vii) An agency plan for review of the rule no less than every ten (10) 
years to determine whether, based upon the evidence, there remains a 
need for the rule including without limitation whether: 
(a) The rule is achieving the statutory objectives; 
(b) The benefits of the rule continue to justify its costs; and 
(c) The rule can be amended or repealed to reduce costs 
while continuing to achieve the statutory objections. 
(f)(1)(A) Each rule adopted by an agency is effective thirty (30) days after 
filing of the final rule with the Secretary of State unless a later date is 
specified by law or in the rule itself. 
(B) A final rule shall not be filed until the thirty-day public comment period 
required under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section has expired. 
(C)(i) After the expiration of the thirty-day public comment period and 
before the effective date of the rule, the agency promulgating the rule 
shall take appropriate measures to make the final rule known to the 
persons who may be affected by the rule. 
(ii) Appropriate measures shall include without limitation posting the 
following information on the agency's website: 
(a) The final rule; 
(b) Copies of all written comments submitted to the agency regarding the 
rule; 
(c) A summary of all written and oral comments submitted to the agency 
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regarding the rule and the agency's response to those comments; 
(d) A summary of the financial impact of the rule; and 
(e) The proposed effective date of the final rule. 
(2)(A)(i) However, an emergency rule may become effective immediately 
upon filing or at a stated time less than thirty (30) days after filing if the 
agency finds that this effective date is necessary because of imminent 
peril to the public health, safety, or welfare. 
(ii) The agency's finding, a brief statement of the reasons for the finding, 
and the financial impact statement shall be filed with the rule. 
(B) The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules 
known to the persons who may be affected by the emergency rules. 
Still another statute, codified outside of the Administrative Procedures Act, 
requires that each new rule or amendment to rule be submitted to the Arkansas 
Legislative Counsel for review13  or, when the Legislature was out-of-session, a 
legislative interim committee: 
Review of state agency rules, regulations, amendments, revisions, 
etc. 
(a)(1)(A) In the passage of this section, the General Assembly is aware of 
the significant number of laws which have been enacted granting to 
boards, commissions, departments, and administrative agencies of state 
government the authority to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations. 
(B) The General Assembly is further aware that ample safeguards have 
not been established whereby the General Assembly may be informed of 
circumstances in which administrative rules and regulations do not 
conform to legislative intent. 
(2) It is the purpose of this section to establish a method for continuing 
legislative review of such rules and regulations whereby the General 
Assembly at each legislative session may take remedial steps to correct 
13When the legislature was not in session, this submission was to an interim 
committee of legislators. 
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abuses of rulemaking authority or clarify legislative intent with respect to 
the rulemaking authority granted the administrative boards, commissions, 
departments, or agencies. 
(b)(1)(A) Whenever a state agency finalizes the promulgation of a rule or 
regulation or a revision, amendment, or change in the regulation, a copy 
shall be filed with the Bureau of Legislative Research if the rule or 
regulation contains any changes from the initial filing of the rule or 
regulation. 
(B) A state agency shall notify the Legislative Council of its intention to 
repeal any rule or regulation which is on file with the bureau. 
(2) As used in this section, “state agency” means any office, board, 
commission, department, council, bureau, or other agency of state 
government having authority by statute enacted by the General Assembly 
to promulgate or enforce the administrative rules and regulations. 
(c)(1) The research staff of the bureau shall study and review all current 
rules, or proposed rules, and all adopted amendments and revisions of 
rules by state agencies and shall report to the Legislative Council in 
regard to them. 
(2) The Legislative Council shall act in an advisory capacity to the General 
Assembly with respect to administrative rules and procedures and shall 
report to the General Assembly at each regular session all administrative 
rules and regulations which the Legislative Council believes to be contrary 
to legislative intent or promulgated without legislative authority. 
(d)(1)(A) The Legislative Council may selectively review possible, 
proposed, or adopted rules and regulations and prescribe appropriate 
Legislative Council procedures for that purpose. 
(B) The Legislative Council may receive and investigate complaints from 
members of the public with respect to possible, proposed, or adopted 
rules and regulations and hold public proceedings on those complaints. 
(2)(A) The Legislative Council may request a representative of an agency 
whose possible, proposed, or adopted rule or regulation is under 
examination to attend a Legislative Council meeting and answer relevant 
questions. 
(B) The Legislative Council may also communicate to the agency its 
nonbinding comments on any possible, proposed, or adopted rule or 
regulation and request the agency to respond to them in writing. 
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(3)(A) The Legislative Council may recommend and refer the 
recommendation to the appropriate committee or committees of the 
General Assembly: 
(i) Enactment of a statute to improve the operation of an agency; and 
(ii) That a particular rule or regulation be superseded in whole or in part by 
statute. 
(B) Subdivision (d)(3)(A) of this section does not preclude any committee 
of the General Assembly from reviewing a rule or regulation on its own 
motion or recommending that it be superseded in whole or in part by 
statute. 
(4)(A)(i) If the Legislative Council considers all or any portion of a rule or 
regulation to be beyond the procedural or substantive authority delegated 
to the adopting agency, the Legislative Council may file notice of that with 
the agency issuing the rule or regulation in question. 
(ii) The notice shall contain a concise statement detailing theprecise 
reasons that the Legislative Council considers the rule or regulation, or 
portion thereof, to be beyond the procedural or substantive authority 
delegated to the agency. 
(B) The Legislative Council shall maintain a permanent register open to 
public inspection of all notices. 
(C)(i) Within thirty (30) calendar days after the filing of an objection by the 
Legislative Council to a rule or regulation, the issuing agency shall 
respond in writing to the Legislative Council. 
(ii) After receipt of the response, the Legislative Council may withdraw or 
modify its findings. 
(D) The failure of the Legislative Council to file a notice regarding a rule or 
regulation is not an implied legislative authorization of its procedural or 
substantive validity. 
(5) The Legislative Council may make nonbinding recommendations to an 
agency that it adopt a rule or regulation. 
(e)(1)(A) Before any rule or regulation of any state agency may be 
revised, promulgated, amended, or changed, a copy of the rule or 
amendment to existing rules and a financial impact statement shall be 
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filed with the bureau at least thirty (30) days before the expiration of the 
period for public comment on the rule pursuant to the Arkansas 
Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq., or other acts 
pertaining to the rule-making authority of that agency. 
(B) The scope of the financial impact statement shall be as provided 
under the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq., 
and shall include without limitation the estimated cost of complying with 
the rule or regulation and the estimated cost for the agency to implement 
the rule or regulation. 
(2) The bureau shall review the proposed revised or amended rule or 
regulation and, if it is believed that the rule or regulation is contrary to 
legislative intent, shall file a statement thereof with the Legislative Council. 
(3) Filings under the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 
et seq., and any comment on the proposed rule or regulation prepared by 
the bureau shall be submitted to the Legislative Council at the next regular 
meeting following its filing with the Legislative Council. 
(f)(1) In addition, before any rule or regulation of any state agency may be 
revised, promulgated, amended, or changed, a copy of the rule or 
amendment to existing rules shall be filed with the interim committees of 
the General Assembly having responsibility for review of that agency 
under Acts 1977, No. 100. 
(2) The filing shall be made at least thirty (30) days before the expiration 
of the period for public comment on the rule, pursuant to the Arkansas 
Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq., or other acts 
pertaining to the rulemaking authority of the agency. 
(g)(1) The Joint Budget Committee shall establish the Administrative Rule 
and Regulation Review Subcommittee. 
(2)(A) The Administrative Rule and Regulation Review Subcommittee 
shall consist of twenty-two (22) members of the General Assembly. 
(B)(i) Nine (9) members of the Administrative Rule and Regulation Review 
Subcommittee shall be appointed by the Senate Cochair of the Joint 
Budget Committee. 
(ii) The Senate Cochair of the Joint Budget Committee shall designate 
one (1) of his or her appointees as Senate Cochair of the Administrative 
Rule and Regulation Review Subcommittee. 
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(C)(i) Nine (9) members of the Administrative Rule and Regulation Review 
Subcommittee shall be appointed by the House Cochair of the Joint 
Budget Committee. 
(ii) The House Cochair of the Joint Budget Committee shall designate one 
(1) of his or her appointees as House Cochair of the Administrative Rule 
and Regulation Review Subcommittee. 
(3) The cochairs and co-vice chairs of the Legislative Council shall be ex 
officio members of the Administrative Rule and Regulation Review 
Subcommittee. 
(4)(A) The Administrative Rule and Regulation Review Subcommittee may 
meet only during a regular, fiscal, or extraordinary session of the General 
Assembly. 
(B) The Administrative Rule and Regulation Review Subcommittee shall 
meet at the call of the cochairs of the Administrative Rule and Regulation 
Review Subcommittee. 
(5)(A) During a regular, fiscal, or extraordinary session of the General 
Assembly, the Administrative Rule and Regulation Review Subcommittee 
may perform the functions assigned to the Legislative Council under this 
section. 
(B) Actions taken by the Administrative Rule and Regulation Review 
Subcommittee under subdivision (g)(5)(A) of this section have the same 
effect as actions taken by the Legislative Council under this section. 
(C) If the Administrative Rule and Regulation Review Subcommittee 
meets during a regular, fiscal, or extraordinary session of the General 
Assembly, the Administrative Rule and Regulation Review Subcommittee 
shall file a report of its actions with the Legislative Council as soon as 
practicable. 
While the above legislatively imposed restrictions upon administrative rulemaking 
make the process of regulation more time-consuming and expensive, they are not 
without logic.  The legislature created the agencies in the first place.  It makes sense for 
the legislature to monitor what its creations are up to.  An agency did not need 
legislative permission to make or change a rule, but the legislature needed to be 
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informed.  Then, should the legislature conclude that an agency’s rule was not 
appropriate, it had pretty strong powers of persuasion. 
But wait!  Here there is the news.  We, the voters of this state just passed 
Amendment No. 92 to our state’s constitution creating a new Section 42 of the 
Constitution’s Article 5.  The amendment is short and simple: 
Review and approval of administrative rules 
(a) The General Assembly may provide by law: 
(1) For the review by a legislative committee of administrative rules 
promulgated by a state agency before the administrative rules 
become effective; and 
(2) That administrative rules promulgated by a state agency shall 
not become effective until reviewed and approved by the legislative 
committee charged by law with the review of administrative rules 
under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. 
(b) The review and approval by a legislative committee under subsection 
(a) of this section may occur during the interim or during a regular, special, 
or fiscal session of the General Assembly. 
It looks like the Oil and Gas Commission will now need advance legislative 
approval of even the smallest, least controversial rule or rule change.  The Amendment, 
all by itself, changed nothing.  It simply empowered the Legislature to enact enabling 
legislation to define and appoint a legislative committee with power over all rules of 
administrative agencies, including the Oil and Gas Commission.  That enabling 
legislation could still leave us with a workable system, or not. 
So what will the enabling legislation look like?  As of this moment, we don’t 
know.  State Senator Jonathan Dismang, the original sponsor of Amendment 82 
introduced a bill on the very first day of the current session.  It is Senate Bill No. 2. 
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However, it is nothing but a bill title as it currently sits in the hopper.  It is what we call a 
“shell bill,” a place-holder occupying a bill number until the sponsor is ready to publish 
the real proposal.  Shell bills are not uncommon.  Senator Dismain wants to control the 
timing of this legislative discussion.  Meanwhile, it is hard to muster much opposition to 
a shell bill, since people first want to know what it is they are against. 
Still, we can begin thinking what we want the legislature to do about Amendment 
92.  Here are some suggestions, in no particular order of importance: 
1. The enabling legislation should set forth a timetable for legislative review.  It 
should require the review committee to approve or disapprove a submitted proposed 
regulation within a relatively short time frame and provide that if the committee fails to 
approve or disapprove within that time frame, the regulation becomes effective. 
Without that, the committee could disable an agency by simply ignoring its proposals. 
2. The enabling legislation should permit agencies to enact emergency 
regulations, as before, without waiting for the review process.  Certainly, subsequent 
review might disapprove and thus terminate such emergency regulations, but 
emergencies happen and need to be dealt with as such. 
3. The enabling legislation should construct the reviewing committee or 
committees in such a way that they contain legislators who understand what the agency 
submitting the regulation under review does.  Amendment 92 does not restrict the 
Legislature’s option to a single committee.  We could have specialized legislative 
committees for each type of agency whose regulation was involved in the review. 
Just when you thought we were done, here is more!!!  The last dance at the 
inaugural ball was hardly finished when he issued Executive Order No. 15-2, which now 
involves the Governor’s office in every new administrative regulation adoption or 
amendment.  For your very own look at Executive Order No. 15-2, turn the page. 
This could all work out fine, I guess, but I am worried that too much of this 
oversight may hamper the agency which I care about from doing its job.  It looks as 
though we have fixed a problem which we never had.  I can imagine problems in the fix. 
16 
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Meanwhile, very recently, another bill has been introduced into the Legislature 
dealing with administrative agencies.  This one appears to make more sense than 
most.  Senate Bill No 382, introduced by Senator Eddie Joe Williams seeks to 
tentatively reorganize Arkansas’ many duplicative administrative agencies into ten 
departments, each with a provisional department secretary appointed by the Governor. 
The secretaries’ first charge would be to study permanent reorganization of these 
agencies into similar departments and, hopefully eliminate the obvious waste from 
unnecessary duplication. 
The Oil and Gas Commission would be provisionally become part of the 
Department of Natural Resources along with the Natural Resources Commission, the 
Water Well Commission, the Forestry Commission, the Geological Survey, the Division 
of Engineering, the HVACR Program of the Department of Health, the Marine 
Sanitation Program and the Federal Housing and Urban Development Community 
Development Block Grant program of the Arkansas Economic Development 
Commission. 
Just reading a list of all of Arkansas’ boards, committee’s and agencies will 
exhaust you.  You see, this very same cost-cutting Arkansas Legislature has managed 
to create, over the years, over 150 state boards and agencies, many of which you have 
never heard of, each of which has a budget of some sort. 
I like the Oil and Gas Commission, just like it is.  Still, I can see more sense in 
this proposal than most of what comes out of the Legislature these days.  Also, even if 
Senate Bill No. 382 is enacted, it will only begin a study to determine whether 
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reorganization and/or consolidation of agencies would be a good idea.  It is hard to be 
against studying. 
Well, enough of that.  Lets look at a couple of recent cases. 
Eighth Circuit Court Affirms District Court’s Denial of New Trial Over Jurors’ 
Outside-of-Record Discussion in Damage-From-Drilling Case 
Our constitutions, both federal and state, guarantee for us a right of trial by a jury 
of our peers, whatever “peer” means.  Ponder this sad story.  XTO Energy Inc. drilled a 
well near a road named “Bluebonnet Lane,” in White County, on land owned by one 
Todd Williams, whose next-door neighbor was Ruby Hiser.  Todd was fine with the deal 
but Ruby was not pleased. 
It seems Ruby’s house was falling down.  In her suit she blamed XTO, claiming 
that XTO’s “drilling machinery and equipments [sic], has created mechanical vibrations 
which have caused near-destruction to [her] home...”  Ms. Hiser went on to itemize, in 
detail that she suffered “foundation blocks cracked, block mortar destroyed, foundation 
rendered unstable and unlevel, separation of roofing, ceramic tile and mortar being 
cracked and loosed, separation of countertops, cracks in ceiling, broken bay window, 
door hinge bolts worked out, cracks in sheet rock, and constant vibrations being now 
evident and detectable to the human senses.”  Indeed, as she continued, “Defendant's 
drilling operations damaged the Plaintiff's house, and destroyed it from the foundation 
to the trusses. This damage is constant, continuing and will ultimately lead to the total 
destruction of the Plaintiff's house.”  Somehow she failed to allege she herself had been 
rendered sick, sore and lame, instead relying only upon her property damage claim. 
XTO removed the case to United States District Court. 
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It was beyond dispute that Ms. Hiser’s house was a wreck. XTO contended that 
was caused by its poor construction, not XTO’s well.  The trial was laced with XTO’s 
objections to a near-complete lack of evidence connecting the Hiser home’s structural 
problems to XTO’s drilling.14    About all that Ms. Hiser’s expert was allowed to say was 
that the cracks in her house were “consistent” with vibrations.  Apparently, that was her 
total case.  In spite of that little technicality, XTO’s peers returned a verdict in favor of 
Ms. Hiser for $100,000 actual and $200,000 punitive damages.15 
XTO’s appeal was based upon a claim of juror misconduct.  During its 
deliberations, the jury submitted this question to the district court:  “Were they drilling 
only or were they also fracking?”  That is a pretty strange question, considering that 
hydraulic fracturing was never mentioned, by anyone, during the trial. The court 
responded that the jury could only consider the evidence before it.  Afterward, XTO 
submitted an affidavit from one juror swearing that the jury had indeed discussed 
“common knowledge” that fracking caused vibrations and earthquakes. 
XTO moved for new a trial, based upon its contention that the “jury verdict was 
tainted by the consideration of extra-record evidence.”  After a hearing, that motion was 
denied by the district court, which also denied XTO’s request to subpoena the juror who 
had allegedly instigated the “fracking” discussion but who did not respond to the court’s 
request for a voluntary interview.  The district court concluded that XTO had not met its 
14Which were mostly overruled. 
 
15I the $100,000 actual damages appears to just be a number plucked from 
space and my brain is incapable of understanding how to justify any punitive damages 
on what was, at best, a simple negligence claim. 
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burden to show that the jury’s apparent fracking discussion influenced the verdict.  The 
appeals court affirmed, holding that the trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
Is there a lesson here?  Can anything be learned from this?  How shoulda 
defendant defend against a theory of causation which the plaintiff never even presented 
at trial, but the jury may have considered, anyway? 
There are no correct answers to those questions.  The real problem is one we 
see far too often.  A trial court apparently viewed its duty to be one of simply rolling the 
ball to the jury and getting out of the way. 
This is exactly what starts some people demanding “tort reform.” Indeed, as of 
this writing, there are no less than ten House or Senate Joint Resolutions pending in 
Arkansas’ current legislative session dealing either with specific tort reform or seeking 
to transfer control of the state’s civil justice system from the Supreme Court to the 
Legislature.  I am getting to the point where I do not blame those who champion such 
ideas of “reform,” though I have not seen many things that the Arkansas’ legislature 
made better.  The point is this.  If our system of trial by “peers” is going to survive a 
legislative revolt, judges must become better filters between the litigants and the jury. 
Too often they seem to abdicate that role.  When judges just let the jury sort it out, 
Hiser is often what you get, and that is not good.16 
16I acknowledge a bit of a disconnect here, since Hiser was a federal court case and the 
clear and present tort reformers are in the state legislature.  Still, you get my point, don’t you. 
Hiser is a great example of why being a plaintiff in a jury case easily beats the lottery.  And, if 
anything, we would expect less of that lottery business in federal court than in state court.  I am 
sure that is the reason XTO removed Hiser, to begin with.  Be careful what you wish for. 
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FEDERAL APPEALS COURT AFFIRMS SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT A LESSEE MAY RELEASE AN 
OIL AND GAS LEASE AND THUS  DISCHARGE ITS DRILLING OBLIGATION 
First Tennessee Bank, Trustee, v. Pathfinder Exploration, LLC17  affirmed a 
United States district court’s award of summary judgment to a lessee, Pathfinder, 
dismissing trustee’s claim that Pathfinder owed it liquidated damages for failing to 
perform its duty, under a provision of  the lease, to drill five wells during the lease term. 
Pathfinder paid approximately $2.3 million dollars as up-front bonus for the leases 
which contained an express requirement that it drill a minimum of five wells on the 
leased lands.  The lease provided for liquidated damages of $100,000 for each well not 
drilled. 
When it realized the lease’s area was not prospective, Pathfinder executed and 
recorded a release of that lease.  The lessor then sought $500,000 in liquidated 
damages for failure to drill any of the promised wells.  Both the district court and Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the lease’s Surrender Clause gave the lessee the 
unilateral ability to terminate the lease at any time, without further liability.  The appeals 
court’s decision was based, largely, upon the decision the Arkansas Court of Appeals in 
a case with similar facts, Frein v. Windsor Weeping Mary, LP.18    While the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals is only an intermediate appeals court, its decision in a case which the 
Eighth Circuit Court termed “not distinguishable” is the “best evidence of Arkansas Law” 
on the subject. 
FEAR NOT.  THE ARKANSAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS BUSY MAKING YOU SAFE 
17  754 F.3d 489 (2014). 
18  2009 Ark. App. 774, 366 S.W. 367 (2009). 
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2015 is an odd number.  We all know what that means.  There is a giant tea 
party ongoing in Little Rock where our elected Senators and Representatives are 
competing to see which of them can champion the nuttiest piece of Obama-hating, gun- 
toting, gay-bashing, abortion-stopping wannabe law.  The winning representative or 
Senator will capture the bi-annual award bestowed by a group of legislative insiders 
named the “Gang Of Over-Reacting, Fifth-wit Yokels,” who emerge each odd year to 
present the coveted “Goofy.”  Right now, with most of the players still out on the course, 
we have a virtual tie in the clubhouse between House Bill No. 1077, sponsored by 
Representative Charlie Collins and Senate Bill No. 229, sponsored by Senator John 
Cooper.  Representative Collins’ entry in the sweepstakes is titled:  AN ACT 
CONCERNING THE POSSESSION OF A CONCEALED HANDGUN IN A 
UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE, OR COMMUNITY  COLLEGE BUILDING; AND FOR OTHER 
PURPOSES.  Its subject appears to be of much legislative concern, lately–guns, guns 
and guns.  During the Legislature’s 2013 session, Collins earned the support of the gun 
lobby by championing a law permitting certain persons19  who had taken the quickie 
concealed weapons course, to pack their heat on college campuses.  Fortunately, 
though, schools had the right to affirmatively opt out of that legislation.  So far, every 
campus in the state has wisely, opted out. 
Not to be deterred, Rep. Collins filed House Bill No. 1077 in the current session. 
The bill, if it was ever enacted, would remove the opt-out option and require educators 
to let their employees pack more to school than just lunch.  That, according to Rep. 
19Essentially, full time employees. 
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Collins, will stop those mindless school shootings going on out there. 
Makes sense, right?  He assures us that the mindless shooter will think twice 
before committing unspeakable violence at a place where he knows someone might be 
armed.  To a few of we sceptics, that logic may be a bit flawed.  If mindless shooters 
are truly mindless, they likely give little or no thought to who might shoot back. 
Senator Cooper’s bill is harder to explain.  The title is AN ACT TO PROTECT 
THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GRANTED UNDER THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION; TO DECLARE AMERICAN 
LAWS FOR AMERICAN COURTS; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.  It has to do with 
choice-of-law clauses in contracts.  Read it for yourself: 
(b) A court, arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency ruling or decision 
violates the public policy of this state and is void and  unenforceable if the court, 
arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency  bases its rulings or decisions in the 
matter at issue in whole or in part on any foreign law, legal code, or system that 
does not grant the parties  affected by the ruling or decision one (1) or more of 
the following fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges granted under the 
United States Constitution or the Arkansas Constitution: 
(1) Due process; 
(2) Equal protection; 
(3) Freedom of religion; 
(4) Freedom of speech; 
(5) Freedom of the press; 
6) Keep and bear arms; 
7) Privacy; or 
(8) Marriage, as defined by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 83.20 
Let’s play out a hypothetical.  Senate Billl No. 229 becomes law, God forbid. 
Then Bob, a citizen of Arkansas, makes a business contract with a British Company, 
Harrods of London.  During contract negotiations Harrods’ lawyers succeed in inserting 
20Emphasis added. 
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a choice-of-law provision choosing the law of the United Kingdom.  Bob was not overly 
worried.  English law is, after all the mother of much of our law over here in the new 
world.  When Bob breaches the agreement, Harrods sues and wins. 
“But wait!!!,  Queen’s X!!!,”  shouts Bob’s lawyer.  “The law of the United 
Kingdom does not guarantee ‘rights of Marriage, as defined by Arkansas Constitution, 
Amendment 83.’”21  That is correct.  Same-gender unions are perfectly legal over there. 
So,  is  Harrods’ judgment against the defaulting Arkansas citizen void?  Nope.  Fooled 
you.  “One (1) or more” does not mean “all”.  Therefore, since UK law guarantees 
several of the items on Senator Cooper’s list, Harrods skates through by the skin of its 
due process.  Come to think of it, there are not many places on earth that don’t 
guarantee at least one of the eight items on the Senator’s list.  Even those repressive 
nations which deny its citizens the first seven would be all for number eight.  What on 
earth is the point of this bill? 
Well, at least neither of those bills are directly related to natural resources law 
and my job is to concentrate on those bills which are so related.  As of this date, with 
the aforementioned legislation dealing with administrative agencies, only one filed bill 
meets that criteria and it is harmless. Senate Bill No. 2015, by Senator B. Pierce, 
would amend the Brine Conservation Act to permit the expansion of existing brine 
production units through brine expansion units.  The result would be to append an new 
21We all know that Amendment 83 defines “marriage” as a union between one (1) 
man and one (1) woman, both being primate human beings, and expressly prohibits 
any other marriage and forbids its recognition in this state, even if legally entered into 
elsewhere.  Also, If we read the news, we also know that said Amendment 83 has been 
declared unconstitutional by one (1) Circuit Judge and one (1) United States District 
Court Judge, to date. 
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brine expansion unit to the existing unit with which it was geologically related and add 
the brine owners within the expansion unit to those entitled to statutory royalty during 
the time that the expansion unit either produced or injected brine.  The bill also corrects 
the name of the federal pricing index used for annual escalation of the brine royalty 
from the United States Producer Price Index for Intermediate Materials, Supplies and 
Components22  to the United States Producer Price Index for Processed Goods for 
Intermediate Demand.23 
Another pending bill needs mention.  House Bill No. 1158, by Representative 
Womack, has already cleared its House committee.  It’s title is AN ACT TO AMEND 
ARKANSAS LAW CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN A LAWFUL 
OCCUPATION; TO STIMULATE JOB CREATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
WHILE PRESERVING HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS; AND FOR OTHER 
PURPOSES.  Essentially, this bill guarantee that every person could engage in the 
occupation of his or her choice unless the state met its burden to prove, by “clear and 
convincing evidence” that the Government “has an important interest in protecting 
against present and recognizable harm to the public health or safety” and “the 
occupational regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering the important 
governmental interest.” 
The Arkansas Bar Association officially opposes this bill, because of its concern 
that it may authorize an unqualified and unlicensed person to engage in law practice.  I 
22Which no longer exists. 
23Which does exist, at least for now. 
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see the glass as half-full.  I always wanted to be a brain surgeon. 
It will be surprising if there are not more specifically natural resource related bills 
introduced before the session’s end.  I cannot remember a legislative year without at 
least one bill designed to revert severed mineral interests to the surface owners.  There 
is plenty of time for that.  The session is still young. 
Meanwhile, to fend off the boredom while waiting, we note a little gem now alive 
in Mississippi’s legislature.  It is Mississippi Senate Bill No. 2316, titled :  AN ACT TO 
CREATE THE MISSISSIPPI MINERAL RIGHTS REFORM ACT OF 2015; TO 
REQUIRE REGISTRATION OF SEVERED MINERAL INTERESTS IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE CHANCERY CLERK OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE MINERAL 
INTEREST IS LOCATED; TO PROVIDE FOR FORFEITURE TO THE STATE OF ANY 
SEVERED MINERAL INTEREST NOT SO REGISTERED; AND FOR RELATED 
PURPOSES. 
If it becomes law, this bill will require each separate owner of each severed 
mineral interest in all of Mississippi to record a “verified statement, in triplicate, setting 
forth the owner's address, interest in the minerals, and both (i) the legal description of 
the property upon or beneath which the interest exists, and (ii) the book and page 
number of the instrument by which the mineral interest is created or acquired.  No 
statement may be recorded which contains mineral interests from more than one (1) 
governmental section unless the instrument by which the mineral interest is created or 
acquired includes mineral interests from more than one (1) governmental section.” 
Severed mineral owners will have until January 1, 2016 to get this done.  Failure to 
comply will result in forfeiture of the interest in question to the State of Mississippi. 
27 
 
The bill is somewhat similar to severed mineral prescription bills which are filed in 
Arkansas’ legislature nearly every session.  However, those bills are usually designed 
to bestow the windfall of the forfeiture upon the lucky surface owner, above the 
previously severed interest, not the dreaded government. 
In a perverse sort of way, I can see justice behind the Mississippi bill.  First, 
assume it is somehow fair to deprive severed mineral owners of their property rights.  In 
that case, why bestow those expropriated minerals to the unworthy surface owners 
when you can use them to balance the state’s budget, thus do-gooding for each and 
every voting/taxpayer.  It will likely not work, however.  Those voters will probably never 
realize their windfall. 
Alas, my deadline for submitting this article looms.  I must close.  Nevertheless, I 
will continue to monitor events and will report any new ones orally, if warranted. 
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